The ECJ 9 March 2017, C-551/15, Pula Parking, shows many important things related to the scope of application of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. The judgment deals with the enforcement of an unpaid public parking debt for a global amount of 13 euros.
According to the judgment, Pula Parking is a company owned by the town of Pula (Croatia), carries out the administration, supervision, maintenance and cleaning of the public parking spaces of that town, the collection of parking fees and other related tasks. On 8 September 2010, Mr Tederahn, who is domiciled in Germany, parked his vehicle in a public parking space of the town of Pula. Pula Parking issued Mr Tederahn with a parking ticket. As provided in the parking contract, which was entered into as a result of the issuing of that ticket, Mr Tederahn was required to pay that ticket within eight days of its date of issue, after which late payment interest accrued. Mr Tederahn did not settle the sums due within the period prescribed. Accordingly, Pula Parking lodged, on 27 February 2015, with a notary whose office is in Pula, an application for enforcement on the basis of an ‘authentic document’ pursuant to the Law of Croatia.
Firstly, the ECJ held that the legal relationship between Pula parking and the Mr Tederahn is of a civil nature, which is paramount for the purposes of Article 1(1) of Regulation Brussels I bis. The concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned but must be regarded as an autonomous European concept to be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems. The legal relationship between the parties to the dispute is of a contractual nature. In that context, the town of Pula or Pula Parking does not exercise public authority powers. Hence, it is a private law relationship and falls, therefore, within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ for the purposes of Regulation 1215/2012.
Secondly, the ECJ held that the concept of ‘court’ for the purposes of the Regulation must be interpreted as that, at least in Croatia, notaries, acting within the framework of the powers conferred on them by national law in enforcement proceedings based on an ‘authentic document’, do not fall within the concept of ‘court’ within the meaning of that regulation.
Teachings derived from this judgments are clear. The legal relationship between a company who manages public interests and an individual is of a private nature. It is a contract. Therefore, the Brussels I-bis Regulation applies in order to specify the competent court and in order to determine the legal effects in the UE of a judgment rendered by the court of a Member State. Nevertheless, a notary can not be regarded as a "court" for the purposes of the Regulation. Thus, the competence of notaries are to be determined in accordance with national rules and not in accordance with the Regulation. Notaries are not courts for the purposes of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. To be or not to be: that's the question.